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Abstract 
Contrary to the prognosis derived from the variety of capitalism literature, since the mid-90s 
the significant restructuring of large German corporations in the direction of shareholder value 
seems to have been compatible with the persistence of a genuine configuration of industrial 
relations, including co-determination at the firm level. This article investigates whether this is a 
long lasting compatibility and tests various research programs in institutional economics and thus 
explores the consequences alternative hypotheses about institutional complementarity or 
hierarchy, comparative institutional analysis, comparative historical analysis, hybridization and 
finally régulation theory. Even if the process is highly uncertain, one major conclusion emerges: the 
old German model is probably irreversibly transformed and is evolving towards an 
unprecedented configuration, with only mild and distant relations to a typical liberal brand of 
capitalism. 
 
QUEL FUTUR POUR LA CODÉTERMINATION ET LE MODE DE 
GOUVERNEMENT DES FIRMES ALLEMANDES ?  
Robert Boyer 
 
Résumé 
Contrairement aux pronostics avancés par la théorie de la variété des capitalismes, depuis le 
milieu des années 90 la considérable transformation des modes de gouvernement des grandes 
firmes allemandes en vue d’adopter les principes de la valeur actionnariale s’est avérée compatible 
avec la persistance d’une forme originale de relations professionnelles, basée sur la 
codétermination. Cet article s’interroge sur le caractère durable de cette configuration et s’attache 
à tester les conséquences de divers programmes de recherche en économie institutionnelle quant 
à cette question. Il explore ainsi l’hypothèse de complementarité/ hiérarchie institutionnelle puis 
il mobilise l’analyse institutionnelle comparative, les approches comparatives historiques. Enfin il 
cerne l’applicabilité de la notion d’hybridation et des problématiques inspirées par la théorie de la 
régulation. Même si le processus est largement ouvert, il apparaît que le modèle de capitalisme 
rhénan enregistre une transformation irréversible et qu’il évolue vers une configuration sans 
précédent, qui n’est pas la copie conforme de la forme emblématique du capitalisme de marché. 
 
JEL Classification : B52 – J51 – M14 – M54 – P52. 
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rhénan – Complementarité / Hiérarchie institutionnelle – Analyses institutionnelles 
comparées – Hybridation – Théorie de la régulation – Crise allemande. 
Keywords : Variety of capitalisms – Codetermination – Shareholder value – German capitalism – 
Institutional complementarity / hirarchy – Comparative institutional analysis – 
hybridization – “Régulation” theory – German crisis. 
  WHAT FUTURE FOR CODETERMINATION AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN GERMANY?  
 
 
Robert BOYER 
 
Introduction: a surprising finding in search for explanation......................................... 1 
 
Are the codetermination and the insider governance part of the complementarities 
typical of the German capitalism? ..................................................................................... 2 
 
The American capitalism: quite distinctive complementarities… ................................ 4 
 
…Hence a priori incompatibility between shareholder value and co-determination 5 
 
How flexibile are the German industrial relations facing a series of structural 
changes?................................................................................................................................. 6 
 
The welfare state as facilitator of corporate restructuring............................................. 8 
 
Contrasting institutional hierarchy with institutional complementarity ...................... 9 
 
Comparative Historical analysis: the progressive reconfiguration of German 
industrial relations and corporate governance............................................................... 10 
 
Comparative institutional analysis: towards a Japanisation of German industrial 
relations?.............................................................................................................................. 12 
 
Success at the firms’ level but major macroeoconomic disequilibrium..................... 14 
 
Institutional change takes time: no premature conclusion! ......................................... 16 
 
Towards an hybridization of the German system?....................................................... 18 
 
Some factors that shape the future of corporate governance and codetermination20 
 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 23 
 
References ........................................................................................................................... 25 
 1 
INTRODUCTION: A SURPRISING FINDING IN SEARCH FOR EXPLANATION 
Within the competition among alternative brands of capitalism, the German institutional 
configuration has permanently played a critical role in assessing the future of the restructuring of 
national economies that has been triggered by the demise of the Golden age. Since the seminal 
work by Michel Albert (1991), the German highly specific industrial relations have been 
perceived as a key component of the success of a productive model based on the diversified 
quality production. More recently, Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001) have made popular the 
idea that the German capitalism was an emblematic example of a coordinated capitalism to be 
opposed to the liberal market capitalism typical of American configuration. They emphasized the 
complementarity between high skill workers, flexible equipments, and quality production. 
Consequently, this configuration could resist to the pressure exerted by the diffusion of new 
technologies and financial globalization, including the evolution of corporate governance in the 
direction of the promotion of shareholder value. Implicitly, this feature was supposed to be 
typical of liberal capitalism, thus totally contradictory with coordinated capitalism. 
 
A recent study challenges this vision that considers the coexistence of two basic and 
alternative brands of capitalism (Höpner, 2003a; 2003b). A systematic analysis of the 
transformations of the organisation of large German companies convincingly shows that the 
codetermination, typical of German industrial relations, has proved to be compatible, at least 
until the early 2000s, with the adoption of the rhetoric and to some extent the practice of 
shareholder value. This article proposes to investigate alternative explanations of this puzzle, 
mobilizing the notions built by various institutionalist research programs. It is important to 
review first the hypothesis of strict institutional complementarity between codetermination and 
the other components of the German productive model (section 1), and then contrasts this 
configuration with the American one (section 2). A second line of argument challenges the 
hypothesis of a strict complementarity (section 3) and discusses the differences between mere 
compatibility, weak and strong complementarity (section 4). A third step introduces the idea that 
the relevant complementarity is not necessary dyadic – between shareholder and codetermination 
– but possibly triadic – only a generous welfare system allowing early retirement made compatible 
the adoption of shareholder value with the persistence of codetermination (section 5). 
 
Another branch of the literature opposes the notion of hierarchy among two institutions to 
the typical complementarity of these institutions. According to this line of analysis, the 
codetermination would not any more be on an equal status with other institutional and 
organisational forms, but would be driven more and more by the requirements of financial 
markets, and this opens the possibility of structural and major changes in the long run for 
industrial relations (section 6). Alternatively, comparative historical analyses suggest other 
explanations and scenarios: codetermination would undergo a process of conversion and 
ultimately a recombination of German industrial relations with a totally different mode of 
governance (section 7). A comparative institutional analysis detects in this new German 
configuration various similarities with the Japanese employment relations and its links with 
corporate governance back to the 70s (section 8). A macro institutionalist approach stresses 
another hypothesis: the large German firms might well cope with the requirements of 
shareholder value at the micro or industry level, but they externalise the social costs associated 
with the slimming down of the workforce. Thus, the disequilibria would pile up into the welfare 
and public deficit, making problematic the full adoption of shareholder value (section 9). Finally, 
a régulationist approach stresses that it takes several decades for a radical institutional change to 
impact upon the régulation mode and the growth regime: the jury would still be out (section 10). A 
similar approach in terms of productive models suggests a still different interpretation: pure 
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imitation of American born shareholder value would be impossible but the adoption of this 
principle would trigger a complex and uncertain process of hybridization, ultimately leading to a 
genuine constitutional configuration, that would differ both from the American and the German 
present configurations (section 11). Confronting these different approaches delivers a list of the 
factors that are the origin of the viability of a new configuration between corporate governance 
and industrial relations (section 12). It is then possible to propose some general but provisional 
conclusions about the future of codetermination.          
ARE THE CODETERMINATION AND THE INSIDER GOVERNANCE PART 
OF THE COMPLEMENTARITIES TYPICAL OF THE GERMAN CAPITALISM? 
One of the major arguments in favour of the diversity of capitalism puts forward that the 
coherence and the stability of given institutional configurations are closely related to the 
complementarity between their components. This argument has been forcefully put forward in 
order to oppose the American to the Japanese firms organisations and by extension the related 
capitalisms (Aoki, 2000; 2001). It applies too for the German capitalism, as pointed out by many 
authors (Streeck, 1991; 1997a; Amable, Barré, Boyer, 1997; Hall, Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2000; 
2003). Under this respect, for any institutional configuration, corporate governance is crucial in 
linking the micro and macro levels (figure 1).  
Figure 1 – Corporate governance and the variety of capitalism 
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On one side, a mode of corporate governance has to be coherent, possibly complementary, 
with the nature of the financial regime – either bank centred or governed by the stock market – 
and the style for industrial relations – organised and negotiated versus governed by the principle 
of the right to manage. On the other side, within the firm the corporate governance has a definite 
impact upon the division of labour, employment relations but also upon the form of competition, 
alternatively driven by price, quality, servicing or innovation. 
 
This analytical framework is useful in order to sketch out the specificity of the German 
capitalism. Basically, the financing and to some extend, the control of firms is the responsibility 
of house banks, whereas collective bargaining is the rule for wage formation. Many scholars 
assess that the patient capital is complementary to the compromise elaborated between the 
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business association and the wage earner unions. At the firm level, a polyvalent work organisation 
is crucial in order to nurture sophisticated products, distinctive by quality and servicing. Again 
there is a strong complementarity between product strategy and human resource management. 
This might be the outcome of a typical rational decision by firm (Hall, Soskice, 2001) but it is not 
necessarily so in the German context, since the history of industrial relations suggests that the 
codetermination at the firm level and the institutionalisation of work councils at the shop-floor 
level derive from demands expressed by the workers and converted into law by the governments. 
Only ex post have these institutions proven to be favourable to the competitiveness of the 
German economy. Thus the imposition of these institutional constraints has benefited both to 
the workers and the firms themselves (Streeck, 1997b). Quite few nation wide institutions, 
especially in the domain of labour relations, do derive from the cooperation that would emerge 
from the confrontation of the self interest of individual actors. By the way, when some typical 
German firms open new plants abroad, they rarely mimic the very specific German configuration, 
especially in terms of skill formation and wage determination. This means that national 
institutional constraints do shape the organisational choices of the firm (Boyer, Freyssenet, 2002). 
Consequently, institutional complementarities are thus converted into organisational 
complementarities (figure 2). 
Figure 2 – Germany: a typical set of complementarities between institutional forms and firms 
organisation  
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The literature of industrial relations points out that the institutional complementarity 
hypothesis (ICH) can be applied fruitfully to the analysis of the German case. There is a 
correspondence between the three levels of labour legislation. 
  
o At the shop-floor level, the works councils express voice instead of exit and thus help in 
designing and operating more efficient labour organisations (Streeck, 1995).  
 
o At the firm level, since 1976, half of the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) of firms with other 
2.000 employees consist of labour representative, even if the chair, appointed by the 
owners, retains a casting vote (FitzRoy, Kraft, 2005: 233). 
 
o At the industry level, at least until the mid-1990, collective bargaining has the task to set 
industry wide wage that has to be adopted by each firm belonging to the same sector.  
 
The works councils complement the presence of wage earners at the supervisory board: the 
later discusses and makes decisions about the grand strategy of the firm whereas the former deals 
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with the everyday management of production, quality, investment in skills (FitzRoy, Kraft, 2005: 
239). The fact that wages are not negotiated at the local or firm level, puts a constraint and an 
incentive in the managerial decision of the supervisory board: instead of allowing the conversion 
of rents into wage differentials, this device helps in promoting productivity, quality, investment in 
firm specific assets (Hübler, Jirjahn, 2003). Last but not least, the 1976 legislation that extends 
codetermination has the merit to overcome the conventional dilemma according which the 
distributional effect probably leads employees to demand an excessive degree of empowerment, 
while employers tend to maximise their share of surplus when employee involvement is low 
(Freeman, Lazear, 1995). These theoretical conclusions tend to be confirmed by the most recent 
econometric studies: when the presence of workers in the supervisory board was increased to 
nearly the half by the 1976 law, a panel data analysis on the two periods 1972-1976 and 1980-
1995 exhibits a weak but robust and positive impact of codetermination on productivity 
(FitzRoy, Kraft, 2005: 243). Many experts finally consider that the German configuration of 
industrial relations displays complementary features both in terms of efficiency and welfare for 
the workers (Figure 3).  
Figure 3 – Work council, codetermination and collective bargaining: the complementrity of 
German industrial relations 
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THE AMERICAN CAPITALISM: QUITE DISTINCTIVE 
COMPLEMENTARITIES… 
The German configuration is therefore highly original, especially when compared with liberal 
capitalism configuration.  The same institutional complementarity hypothesis can be applied, but 
the nature of the institutional and organisational forms is quite different indeed (figure 4).  
 
Since the mid-80s, the innovations on the financial market have permeated the governance of 
large American quoted corporations. Consequently the issue of value creation and the 
reassessment of shareholder value have become central.  
 
o At the macro level, the financial regime has become central in the institutional configuration: the 
search for high and possibly stable rate of return for capital owners has triggered various 
spill-over effects from the monetary regime – the central banker now has to prevent or cure 
financial crisis – to the industrial relations. Actually, more risk has been transferred from 
capital to labour and simultaneously, the collective bargaining typical of the Fordist era, has 
been decaying to be replaced by a vigorous decentralisation and individualisation of 
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employment relations. No surprise then, if wage inequality has been increasing, since it is the 
direct consequence of the balkanisation of American industrial relations. 
Figure 4 – The United-States: a distinctive set of features 
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o At the level of the firm, the diffusion of shareholder control has triggered a series of new 
business practices, such as fast employment reduction when firms face a down-turn, and the 
generalisation of outsourcing both at home and abroad. These changes take place in a context 
of acute price competition for mature sectors and patent race for sunrise industries, where 
innovation is central for the success of firms. 
 
Thus, the American configuration displays too clear complementarities between the financial 
regime and industrial relations on one side, the strategy of the firms and the employment 
relations on the other. Basically, the logic of shareholder value implies a reduction of the rent 
distributed to workers. Hence, a pressure on wage and the diffusion of labour market flexibility. 
Compared with the German configuration, the distribution of income between wage and profit is 
different and simultaneously more risk is transferred from capital to labour.  
…HENCE A PRIORI INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
AND CO-DETERMINATION  
The sharp contrast between the two configurations is confirmed both by some formal 
modelling and by cross national comparative studies. 
 
o When competition is moderate and the technological paradigm stabilized, a financial system 
centred upon bank intermediation entitles the viability of a long term employment 
relationship based upon the cumulativeness of firm specific investment in worker skills. 
Analytically, incremental innovations, bank based financial intermediation and the stability of 
the employment relations are complementary (Ernst, 2001; Amable, Ernst, Palombarini, 
2001; 2002). Conversely, if competition becomes more acute and when radical innovations 
trigger a technological paradigm shift, the firms are rationally induced to adopt another 
strategy based upon direct finance via stock markets and a flexible employment relation, since 
this mix delivers better outcomes and this is an evidence for the complementary between 
these elements. 
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o International comparisons of governance modes suggest an equivalent clustering in the 
distribution of financial regimes and industrial relations (Roe, 1994; 2002). At one extreme, 
the concern for shareholder value is associated with a significant dispersion of share 
ownership and a low degree of workers representation in the management of the corporation. 
At the other extreme, when the industrial relations system gives a significant voice to wage 
earners, generally the ownership is rather centralized and banks play a significant role both in 
the financing and the control of large firms. 
 
These arguments converge in pointing out a potential conflict between shareholder value and 
workers representation. Nevertheless, two different analyses can be given of this incompatibility. 
The first focuses on the hypothesis of institutional complementarity and prognoses the existence 
of two distinctive configurations, in accordance with an analysis in terms of supermodularity 
(Boyer, 2005). A second line of analysis borrows to political economy approaches the idea that 
there is a trade off between owners and wage earners relative power. Consequently, one could 
imagine a continuous distribution of national cases between the two extreme and emblematic 
configuration of US and Germany (figure 5).  
Figure 5 – The links between the nature of ownership and workers representation 
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According to the first framework, the introduction of shareholder value in Germany should 
disrupt the German industrial system. Until the early 2000s, this has not been the case and the 
issue at stake is thus to provide some explanations about this discrepancy between the prognosis 
of an apparent incompatibility between the persistence of codetermination and the (partial or 
global?) adoption of shareholder value by a significant number of large German firms and the 
observation made b Martin Höpner.   
HOW FLEXIBILE ARE THE GERMAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS FACING A 
SERIES OF STRUCTURAL CHANGES? 
Both internal and external factors have put under stress the German industrial relations that 
have been so successful in promoting the competitiveness of the economy, as well as social peace 
(figure 6). 
 
o The German reunification has drastically challenged the viability of the institutional configuration 
of Western länders when applied to Eastern landers. Given the large productivity differentials 
between them, the collective bargaining of a single industry wage has hurt the viability of 
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most Eastern firms. It has thus provoked the withdrawal of some firms from this crucial 
component of German industrial relations (Mueller-Jentsch, Sperling, 1995). This is a first 
move towards the decentralisation of wage bargaining in relation with the need to take into 
account the quite unequal competitiveness of firms, even when they belong to the same 
sector. Furthermore, the legacy of the German reunification conditions – mainly the 
extension to the Eastern länder of all Western Germany economic institutions – is still 
present in 2005 and partially shapes the reforms of labour law and welfare system. 
 
o An increased international competition is the second factor at the origin of institutional and 
organisational change. Firstly, the competition on product markets has turned more intense 
in response to the development of international trade. Consequently, the oligopolistic rents 
traditionally associated to diversified quality production have been eroded (Streeck, 1991). In 
turn this structural change has affected negatively the capital labour compromise, be it in 
terms of high wages, employment stability or welfare benefits. A quite essential permissive 
condition for the German industrial relations has thus be challenged. 
 
o The rise of international investors introduces a third factor of structural change. Basically, the 
financial liberalisation, combined with the multiplication of financial innovations, has been 
the precondition for the introduction and the diffusion of shareholder value. In this context, 
the mobility of capital puts a strong constraint on managerial strategies: they face strong 
incentives to deliver higher rate of return, in line with the standards that prevail in the US. 
This pressure puts under scrutiny the viability of each national configuration, since the 
international financial community promotes a de facto benchmarking of each form of 
capitalism. A typical numerical flexibility of labour is therefore assumed to be required in 
order to sustain shareholder value. 
Figure 6 – Financial regime and industrial relations: the complex German evolution since 1989 
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PERMANENCE AND CHANGES IN CODETERMINATION 
 
 
Facing these strong and converging pressures, the German industrial relations have 
significantly changed, but elements of continuity and factors of change coexist, and this observation 
was already made by German scholars a few years after the German reunification (Mueller-
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Jentsch, Sperling, 1995).  The survey of German firms (Höpner, 2001) suggests the resilience of 
codetermination but its content has changed. Basically, in the Golden Age, codetermination was 
the complement of collective bargaining at the firm level, within a perspective oriented by the 
struggle between capital and labour. In the 2000s, the codetermination seems to have become the 
process according which business reaches a consensus which wage earners in order to sustain the 
viability and competitiveness of a given firm (see figure 6).  
 
From a theoretical standpoint, this first interpretation is built upon a vision that contradicts the 
hypothesis that the success of the German configuration was directly associated to the tightness 
of the complementarity between codetermination, work council and collective bargaining. The 
first complementarity remains, but it significance is altered, whereas the second one has been 
vanishing. An alternative and slightly different explanation would point-out that it is difficult to 
disentangle complementarity from compatibility (Boyer, 2005). More generally, the response to 
unexpected shocks and unprecedented structural changes is up to the degree of slack between the 
components of a given institutional configuration. In retrospect, the German system displays 
such room for adjustment and reorganisation (Streeck, 2003; 2005). This is the first answer to the 
paradox mentioned in the introduction: after all Germany, even not similar to typical liberal 
capitalism, has a lot of built in flexibility. What external labour market flexibility delivers to firms in 
the US is obtained in Germany by the internal flexibility that is enhanced by the conjunction of 
codetermination and work councils. 
THE WELFARE STATE AS FACILITATOR OF CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING 
In spite of this internal flexibility, most of the German corporations in the manufacturing 
sector have slimmed down their workforce, thus mimicking the behaviour of the American 
corporations that follow shareholder value in the permissive context of quite decentralised and 
individualised industrial relations. A priori, this should have deteriorated the morale and 
commitment of the workers, due to the threat of loosing their jobs. Similarly, codetermination 
and work council should have blocked this process of employment reduction, perceived as 
detrimental to the cohesiveness and interest of the workers. Why such a deadlock did not happen 
or if it occurred it was only so to a minor extend?  
 
This second interpretation stresses that codetermination and shareholder value might well be 
contradictory in isolation, since the empowerment of workers enters into conflict with 
shareholder interests (Figure 7A). Nevertheless, if the restructuring of the productive 
organisation and the reduction of employment are made easier by a generous welfare, shareholder 
value and codetermination are made compatible by the adjunction of a third component to 
industrial relations: the nature of the Welfare State (figure 7B). By the way, such a triadic 
complementarity was already observed in the heyday of German industrial relations, but the 
content was quite different: the patient capital delivered by the house bank was complementary 
to the strength of workers at the firm level, via codetermination and work councils and, at the 
economy wide level, by collective bargaining (figure 7C). At least, these three components were 
compatible if not complementary. It is probably so for the contemporary configuration described 
by figure 7B.  
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Figure 7 – Complementarity among several institutions and not only two 
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Actually, it is not an easy task to prove the complementarity of a given set of institutions, 
since one has to select a performance criterion and furthermore to check by formal modelling 
(Milgrom, Roberts, 1990) or by econometric studies (Ernst, 2001) that this performance is 
improved by this precise conjunction of institutions. Such an uncertainty, still exacerbated for a 
real time analysis, is quite difficult to overcome. Therefore this second interpretation is more a 
provisional hypothesis that a firm conclusion, but it brings and interesting idea in the discussion 
of the future of German industrial relations. Their evolution cannot be disentangled from the 
transformation of a series of other institutional forms, such as welfare. 
CONTRASTING INSTITUTIONAL HIERARCHY WITH INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPLEMENTARITY 
The notion of complementarity implicitly assumes an equal role for every institution or 
organisation entering into this relation. According to an evolutionary theorising, the process of 
co-evolution is a possible mechanism according which largely unexpected complementarity may 
emerge (Streeck, 2003). Nevertheless, within each historical period and for a given society, some 
institutional forms might be more important than others (Boyer, Saillard, 2002). A first definition 
of hierarchy stresses that the internal organisation of institution B is designed in order to be 
compatible with the requirements of another institution A: A is then defined as hierarchically 
superior to B. A second definition considers that A is hierarchically superior to B if the evolution 
of A triggers an endogenous restructuring of B in a direction which benefits to the purpose of A.  
 
According to this distinction, a third interpretation of the codetermination/shareholder paradox 
can be given (figure 8). In the social market economy, whereby Germany is supposed to be the 
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emblematic example, the institutional architecture seems to have been designed in order to 
introduce a series of checks and balances between various entities pursuing different objectives 
(Labrousse, Weiss, 2001). Even if the success was not at all warranted ex ante (Streeck, 1997a), 
this innovation turned out to be quite favourable to economic performance and the reduction of 
social conflicts. By contrast, in a finance-led configuration the international financial regime has 
the leading role in inducing the redesign of the domestic monetary regime, the nature of 
competition, the style of economic policy and even the wage labour nexus (Boyer, 2000b). 
Shareholder value may then be interpreted as a strategy in order to promote the hierarchical 
superiority of the financial regime over any other economic institutions. Consequently, the 
objective and the process of codetermination could well be significantly redesigned according to 
the new imperative of shareholder value. In a sense, the compatibility observed by Martin 
Höpner would only be transitory since the long term configuration that will emerge from a 
complete domination of shareholder value is likely to be quite different from the present one. In 
a sense, a snap shot could not represent the course of action that will result from the unfolding of 
the full scenario of the financialisation (figure 8). 
Figure 8 – A shift in institutional hierarchy?  
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COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS: THE PROGRESSIVE 
RECONFIGURATION OF GERMAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Few theories are available in order to explain the kind of institutional change that is taking 
place in contemporary Germany. At one extreme, path dependency analyses forecast a large 
inertia in institutional change, in response to sunk costs learning by using and the equivalent of 
increasing returns. At the other extreme, some authors share the vision that only fast and radical 
reforms can affect institutional configurations. At odds with these theories, the comparative 
historical analysis (CHA) stresses the variety of mechanisms that induce a series of seemingly 
marginal changes but that finally end-up into a complete transformation of the institutional 
architecture (Thelen, 2003; 2004). The basic idea is that institutions – and also organizations – 
display a significant internal flexibility as soon as one opens the black box of institutions and 
organisations.  
 
Actually, any institution results from the mix of an objective or a rationale, a given set of 
procedures, some common references in order to interpret the rule of the game and finally the 
institutions frequently materialises in an organisation. Consequently, nominally an institution 
persists but with significant transformations of one or several components. The same objective 
can call for new procedures that are so successful that they finally change ex post the initial 
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objective they are applied to. Alternatively, the organisation in charge of the management of an 
institution may reorient its activity in order to comply with different objectives. A still more 
striking change is observed when the objectives and procedures are reinterpreted by a new 
generation of actors who react to a quite different environment by comparison with the time of 
the foundation of the institution. These are various forms of conversion. 
 
This framework gives a fourth interpretation of the paradox under review. The institution of 
codetermination keeps the same broad objective, i.e. to give a say to wage earners in the 
managerial decisions of large companies. The same procedures and institutionalisation are 
maintained but a new interpretation is given. At the origin, the presence of wager earners 
representation in the aufsichsrat was conceived as the complement, at the level of the firm, to the 
collective bargaining at the industrial level. Nowadays, codetermination is redesigned in order to 
complement the corporate governance restructuring. The voice of the wage earners is mobilised 
in order to deliver value to the specific shareholders of the company, it is no more the expression 
of the solidarity of wage earners across a given industry. Nominally, codetermination would be 
still operating but its significance and impact would be different (figure 9). 
Figure 9 – The conversion of codetermination 
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CHA proposes a second mechanism in order to understand why a local and partial change, 
such as the conversion of an institution, may trigger a series of spill-overs by the fact that the 
conversion induces the severing of some previous links and simultaneously it favours and 
organises new links with other already existing entities. Thus, the recombination of a new institution 
with elements of an old configuration may be at the origin of a systemic change in the whole 
institutional architecture. This mechanism has been proved quite important in the transformation 
of former Soviet type economies after the collapse of the Berlin wall (Stark, 1997). 
 
Under this respect, the initial configuration for codetermination was organising a strong 
complementarity with collective bargaining. The position of workers entitled them to shape the 
nature of corporate governance, under the rather permissive role of the house bank. 
Codetermination was clearly belonging to the sphere of industrial relations. Since the mid-90s, 
the links between codetermination and the industrial collective bargaining have been weakening, 
especially in response with the strains caused by German reunification. The initiative of change in 
codetermination comes from the managers of German corporations that face the challenge of the 
adoption of shareholder value and more generally value creation. The causality runs then from 
corporate restructuring to industrial relations. Furthermore, the links with industry wide wage 
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negotiation is weakening. Consequently, codetermination tends to become complementary to the 
new style for governance (figure 10). Thus, the conjunction of a new interpretation of 
codetermination and a redesign of the links between the sphere of corporate governance and 
industrial relations are sufficient to explain the surprising compatibility of co-determination and 
shareholder value. Under the same labelling, a rather distinct system is probably emerging. 
Figure 10 – Codetermination: a de-linking with collective bargaining and a new link with 
corporate governance 
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COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS: TOWARDS A JAPANISATION 
OF GERMAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS? 
This new configuration shows some striking similarities with the configuration of Japanese 
industrial relations since the mid-50s. At this epoch, the industry unions have come to accept a 
companyist compromise (Yamada, 2000): wage earners were entitled to defend their interests and 
to confront with managers and entrepreneurs provided their claims were compatible with the 
survival and later the competitiveness of the firms they were enrolled into (Shimizu, 2000). Since 
this major turning point, the Nation wide or industry wide workers unions have been declining 
and the major role of union representatives has been to express voice both in strategic decisions 
at the company level and in production management at the shop floor level. There is another 
parallel with the German evolution. In Japan too, the synchronisation of wage hikes was first at 
the initiative of workers unions in order to trigger a spill-over of wage increases from the best 
performing firms to the rest of the economy. After the oil shocks and successive re-evaluations 
of the Yen, the shunto persisted as an institution, but at the initiative of firms the wage increases 
were then set in order to warrant the competitiveness of the less efficient producers (Tsuru, 
1992). 
 
Such similarities between the German and Japanese trajectories have already been pointed out 
by more systematic comparisons of these two forms of non liberal capitalism perceived to be 
quite distinct from the typical American configuration (Streeck, Yamamura, 2003). This proximity 
between the emerging German industrial relations and the typical Japanese employment system is 
important since it points out that Germany could evolve from one set of complementarity 
between industrial relations and corporate governance to another different nevertheless possibly 
coherent in the long run. The comparative institutional analysis (CIA) proposes a sophisticated 
framework in order to analyse the diversity of the links between firm organisations and nation 
wide institutions (Aoki, 2000; 2001). Basically, the German economy could shift from a three 
level integration of industrial relations to a company based system, where codetermination and 
work councils still manage strategic decisions, production at the shop-floor level, but they are 
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also involved in wage determination. This would fit with the general trend brought by 
internationalisation of production and the process of financialisation: more decentralisation and 
individualisation of the employment relations. According to this fifth interpretation, the 
contemporary Germany and its futurewould be similar to the Japan of the 70s. The 
complementarity would have shifted from the national to the firm level (figure 11). 
Figure 11 – A major decentralisation in German industrial relations 
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Thus, the Japanese and German trajectories continue to show some similarities but also 
dissimilarities both retrospectively and during the contemporary decade. On one side, the 
evolution of German industrial relations during the 90s shows significant parallelism with the 
restructuring that took place in the 60s and 70s in Japan. Similarly, both economies do stress the 
preservation of competitiveness in the redesign of industrial relations and wage formation. On 
the other side, the welfare system continues to be highly developed and collectively organised at 
the federal level in Germany, whereas the bulk of welfare is provided by the large corporations in 
Japan (Theret, 1997). Therefore, at the firm and industry levels, contemporary Germany and the 
Japanese economy of the Golden Age exhibit clear similarities, but this is not the case for the 
régulation modes at the macroeconomic level (table 1). 
Table 1 – Germany and Japan compared: similarities in industrial relations but quite different 
welfare systems 
 60s – 70s  90s 
    
              SIMILARITIES 
 
Japan A diffusion of employment 
stability under the pressure of full 
employment 
 Rationalisation in the use of employment stability, 
given the differentiation of competitiveness sources 
at the level of industries and firms  
    
Germany Imposition by law of 
codetermination 
 Restriction of the use of codetermination to the 
specific sectors where it is efficient 
    
           DISSIMILARITIES 
 
Japan Mainly a company based, rather 
paternalist welfare  
 Aging of population and corporate restructuring 
call for more public intervention in welfare 
    
Germany A Bismarckian universal welfare 
system  
 Significant recurring tensions in the financing of a 
generous welfare state call for reforms 
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SUCCESS AT THE FIRMS’ LEVEL BUT MAJOR MACROEOCONOMIC 
DISEQUILIBRIUM 
This rather optimistic prognosis can be mitigated by another and sixth interpretation derived 
from régulation theory (RT). The observation of the compatibility of two 
organisations/institutions that were previously supposed to be antagonistic – shareholder value 
and codetermination – does not necessarily imply that the observation made for the large 
German companies can be extrapolated at the macro level. Two major reasons could be at the 
origin of a divergence between the good performances of some large companies and 
preoccupying macro economic unbalances. 
  
First of all, the listed companies are not really representative of the whole productive system. 
This brings the issue of firms heterogeneity within the same institutional context. May be large 
German corporations can cope with shareholder values and codetermination but it is not 
necessarily so for small and medium size firms (SME). Since they do not have access to financial 
markets and usually benefit less from public subsidies and support (for instance via early 
retirement), the demography of German firms may be adversely affected. It is especially so if 
direct finance became the dominant form for financing firms. Furthermore, the strategy deployed 
by large corporations in order to obtain large and stable rate of returns on equity may imply a 
generalisation of outsourcing abroad. Given the traditional complementarity between large firms 
and SME in the sources of competitiveness, such a move would be a noticeable threat for the 
long term viability of German productive system. The slow growth of the German economy 
would then question the viability of the whole institutional architecture, induced by the adoption 
of shareholder value by a fraction of German business.  
 
A more general argument stresses that the severing of the links of corporate governance with 
collective bargaining that were typical of the so-called social market economy, could bring large 
macroeconomic unbalances. In the Golden Age, the cohesiveness of German corporate governance 
and industrial relations had the good property of internalising the impact of wage formation on 
employment. Thus, the central bank and the Ministry of Finance could focus on typical 
macroeconomic issues concerning for example the trade off between inflation and 
unemployment. This is no more the case since the early 90s:  the costs of reunification and those 
of corporate restructuring have been externalised to the welfare system and the public budget: the 
financing of early retirement, the subsidies to firms, the reduction in the taxation of profits, all 
these measures have had a negative impact upon public finance and the viability of the German 
welfare (figure 12). 
 
Basically, the slow growth of the German economy, especially noticeable since 2000s, would 
express this divergence between the methods followed by large companies to restructure and 
their macroeconomic impacts. One could observe a surprising, even if partial, similarity between 
the so-called “competitive disinflation” period in France back in the mid-80s and the German 
trajectory since the mid-90s (Boyer, 2004b). In both cases, the large companies have been able to 
modernise and become highly competitive, but they have been shifting a part of the related costs 
to the public sector. This would be the hidden but powerful origin of the permanence of large 
public deficits. In a sense, the large companies have divorced from the domestic territory since 
they can not only sell but also produce and invest abroad, thus breaking down the previous 
complementarity between domestic labour and capital. Rather healthy multinationals prosper,  
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Figure 12 – Sixth interpretation: from the coherence to the divergence of firm strategies and macroeconomic performance 
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whereas some citizens perceive a deterioration of their standards of living and ask for more social 
coverage, at the very moment when the tax base is eroded by the slow growth and the high 
mobility of capital. This interpretation opens a quite gloomy scenario for the German society. 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE TAKES TIME: NO PREMATURE CONCLUSION! 
A key feature of institutional change has not yet be mentioned and apply to the German case: 
the change of some major institutions may affect the whole institutional architecture, i.e. the 
régulation mode, but only in the long term. Basically, the equivalent of one generation, thus 
between two and three decades, is required for the full effectiveness and the complete impact of 
a radical innovation or the conjunction of a series of more incremental innovations. This is a 
quite general teaching derived from the empirical research on the French, American and British 
capitalisms.  
 
o A first example relates to the impact of the labour law that were passed after Front Populaire in 
1936 and furthermore in the immediate after WWII. It is only in the 60s that the related 
indexing of nominal wage upon productivity and inflation has implied the emergence of an 
administrated or monopolitst régulation mode allowing the unprecedented accumulation 
regime based on the synchronisation of mass production and mass consumption (Boyer 
1979).  
 
o The impact of the financialisation on the American wage labour nexus follows the same 
temporal pattern. In 1976, the ERISA law codifies the possibility for wage earners to 
complement the pay as you go pension system by the capitalisation of their contributions to 
the financing their retirement (Montagne, 2004). During nearly two decades, the funds of this 
capitalisation system have continuously grown without altering significantly neither the wage 
labour nexus, nor the source of growth of the American economy. By during the Internet 
bubble of the 90s, this financialisation has altered the way wage income is formed and the 
stock of pension funds has reached such a level compared with the flow of contemporary 
income that a finance-led growth regime has finally emerged (Boyer, 2000a). 
 
o The history of conservative strategies in the UK exhibit a similar lag between the seminal 
decisions about the demise of the post-WWII compromise and the effectiveness of a more 
competitive régulation mode. The decisions about rivatisation, decentralisation, reduction and 
redesign of welfare are taken in the early 80s, but the full impact of these institutional changes 
is finally observed in the early 2000s. Again, nearly two decades have elapsed between the 
beginning of the reforms and the complete implementation of their consequences on social 
stratification, economic specialisation and income distribution…. 
 
There is a strong presumption that such a time lag is to be expected when analysing the 
consequences of shareholder value upon the German wage labour nexus. Actually, the 
contemporary debate about the demise of the German model of capitalism, implicitly assumes a 
radical and rapid reconfiguration of industrial relations. The statistical evidence about the 
coverage of collective agreements as well as the diffusion of fixed term employment in Germany 
contradicts this hint (table 2). The share of industry-wide collective agreements declined from  
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Table 2 – The coverage by collective agreement and the share of fixed term employment 
contracts in Germany 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Industry-wide collective agreements        
West Germany - - 68 % 65 % 63 % 63 % 63 % 62 % 
East Germany - - 50 % 46 % 44 % 44 % 43 % 43 % 
Firm-level collective agreements         
West Germany - - 8 % 8 % 7 % 8 % 7 % 8 % 
East Germany - - 13 % 11 % 11 % 12 % 12 % 11 % 
Orientation on existing collective agreements       
West Germany - - - 13 % 15 % 15 % 16 % 16 % 
East Germany  - - 22 % 24 % 24 % 23 % 24 % 
No collective agreement, no orientation        
West Germany - - - 14 % 15 % 14 % 14 % 14 % 
East Germany - - - 21 % 21 % 21 % 22 % 22 % 
Fixed term contracts         
West Germany 16.0 % 15.9 % 16.7 % 17.1 % 13.9 % 11.6 % 12.2 % 12.3 % 
East Germany 7.2 % 8.0 % 8.6 % 9.2 % 7.8 % 9.2 % 7.4 % 7.7 % 
Source: IAB-Betriebspanel, quoted by Ulrich Jürgen & al. (2005, p. 6 and 8). 
 
1998 to 2000 but since then, it remains constant. Firm level agreements only represent 8 % in 
West Germany and 11-12 % in East Germany. Furthermore, if collective agreements at the 
industry level are the majority in West Germany, they represent the minority in East Germany. 
Clearly, the conditions of German reunification has still play a role in the tensions observed 
within the German industrial relations. 
 
But these statistical series may suggest a false interpretation: the system would be finally quite 
inert and unchanged. Actually, the retrospective of the nature of the agreements that took place 
shows that deep structural change are taking place in the bargaining between capital and labour. 
The opening of company or plant level negotiation is the basis for the so-called opening clauses, 
according which social partners may decide agreements that are exception and derogation to the 
conclusion of industry wide bargaining. In 1990 IG-Metal concedes on the reduction to 35 hours. 
In 1993, social partners agree to introduce hardship clauses and finally in 2004, the opening 
clause is extended to cover wage and all regulations that previously were decided at the industrial 
level. This qualitatively transformed institutional context is the origin of the surge of plant level 
alliances for employment and competitiveness (betriebliche Bündniss zur beschaftigunssicherung und 
Wettbewerbsstärkung). This de facto if not de jure decentralization and individualisation of industrial 
relations is logically a drastic challenge for the permanence of the model inherited of the WWII 
and reinforced in the mid-70s. The logical conclusion is that a structural change in the links 
between corporate governance and codetermination is taking place since a decade. The prognosis 
would then be that the process will continue and will drastically redesign the configuration of the 
social market economy.  How long is the long run for institutional change? Quite long indeed! 
Probably about two or three decades. 
 
In a sense, the sixth and seven interpretations converge in forecasting a definite move out of 
the post-WWII configuration. By the way, the conclusion is at odds with the optimist prognosis 
that proposes the variety of capitalisms approach (Hall, Soskice, 2001). 
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TOWARDS AN HYBRIDIZATION OF THE GERMAN SYSTEM?  
Most of the discussions about institutional change deal with two issues. The first one stresses 
the stability of institutional configurations typical of path dependency mechanisms. The second 
approach studies the transition from one existing configuration to another, quite different but 
well known. Frequently the benchmark for such a transition is the more successful country at the 
time of the comparison. Actually, the literature on productive systems as well as on the diversity 
of capitalism points out a different pattern of change: various economic systems are submitted to 
the same pressures, including those associated with foreign competition, but different initial 
configurations and alternative strategies adopted by firms, collective actors and governments 
finally generate quite contrasted trajectories (figure 13). Let us review first the common trends 
and then exhibit the factors of differentiation. 
 
o In many European countries, the evolution of corporate law displays significant similarities. The 
composition of the board of the large quoted companies is redesigned in favour of 
independent directors. Parliaments do pass new regulations about the disclosure of 
information and the transparency of stock market, whereas the rules governing merger and 
acquisition are revised in order to promote more competition on the corporate governance 
market. 
 
o The labour law reforms show similar convergence across a large sample of countries. Previously 
centralised industrial relations evolve towards a significant decentralisation at the firm or even 
the plant level. The employment relations experience a noticeable differentiation and 
individualisation. Last but not least, quite all countries face the need for reforming the 
financing and organisation of the various components of their Welfare, especially 
unemployment benefits and pensions.  
Figure 13 – A common impulse by shareholder value, but a renewed divergence 
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Nevertheless, these factors of change interplay with each domestic configuration and thus 
three features explain the high likelihood of different trajectories and in some cases diverging 
patterns. First, the past institutional and technological legacy is a first factor of differentiation and 
previous studies have recurrently shown that at least four brands of capitalism coexisted during 
the Golden Age. If typically an identical exogenous change implies similar evolutions within 
similar régulation modes, it is no more the case when idiosyncratic complementarities define 
different macroeconomic adjustment processes. Furthermore, during periods of structural 
change, the responsibility of institutional change is related to the nature of social struggles and 
political alliances. There are strong factors of differentiation of régulation modes, even in the era of 
globalisation.  
 
Therefore, even though firms and governments refer to benchmarking in the design of the 
organisational and institutional reforms, the probability of the pure replication of a reference 
model is highly unlikely. This has been observed during the Golden Age when the diffusion of 
mass-production has been associated with the emergence of growth models and régulation modes 
quite distinctive from the American configuration (Boyer, Saillard, 2002). Since the same finding 
has been obtained by the analysis and history of productive models (Boyer, Charron, Jürgens, 
Tolliday, 1998), it is tempting to coin the concept of hybridization of institutional configurations. 
 
Clearly in contemporary world, due to the central position occupied by the American 
economy and the continuous opening of most economies to trade, FDI and portfolio 
investment, many if not all societies are challenged and induced to adopt some, and ideally all, 
American institutions. During the last decade, the concern for shareholder value has been 
introduced in quite all OECD countries, including Germany and Japan. The conventional 
prognosis derived from economic theory would be that each country has interest in introducing 
these institutions because they are more efficient: once the social and political resistances are 
overcome, the various institutional configurations should converge towards a financial market-led 
form of capitalism. Such a conclusion drastically underestimates the resilience of national 
configurations that generally exhibit a form of complementarity different from the American one. 
The initial incompatibility for instance between shareholder value, the nature of financial system 
and the rights given to workers by labour laws, triggers a process of adaptation, of trial and error, 
that progressively differentiates the new institutions from their original counterparts. 
 
In the case of Germany, the strength of the legal recognition of workers rights within the firm 
has not triggered a destruction of codetermination, but induced a redesign of its objectives and 
content. The decentralisation of industrial relations which take place does not totally erode the 
power of negotiation of workers, contrary to that happened during the last two decades in the 
US. Similarly, direct finance does not become the dominant nor exclusive method for financing 
investments and consequently the financial system continuous to be based both on credit 
banking for SME and the financing on the stock market for the large firms. Consequently, until 
now, the German configuration has not converged towards the implicit reference model. 
Paradoxically the decentralisation of codetermination makes the German industrial relations 
functionally similar to the company unions that are observed in Japan. If this analysis is correct, 
the relevant reference for comparisons of German industrial relations and corporate governance 
should shift from the US to Japan (figure 14). 
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Figure 14 – The surprising consequences of hybridization: the proximity of Germany with 
respect to Japan 
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SOME FACTORS THAT SHAPE THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND CODETERMINATION 
Do the stiffening of competition and the financial globalization restrict the likelihood of 
hybridization and consequently prevent the differentiation of the links between industrial 
relations and corporate governance? Actually, the analyses in terms of institutional competitive 
advantage suggest that the internationalisation of economies logically induces a deepening of 
economic specialisation. The variety of capitalism approach (Hall, Soskice, 2001; Hancké, 1999) 
points out that not only productive organisations but also innovation systems are differentiated 
according to the nature of the institutional forms prevailing in each country (figure 15 a et b). 
Under this respect, it is important to note again that in 2004-2005 the German economy 
experience a large trade surplus for at least two reasons: first the slow domestic growth reduces 
imports and is an incentive for producers to shift from the domestic to the international market; 
second the best performance originates from the sectors such as the car and machine tools 
industries that still maintain codetermination and work councils (Jürgens, Krzywdzinski, Teipen, 
2005). This means that the persistence of these features do not totally hinder the German 
competitiveness, at odds, with the now common vision according which the German 
configuration would be totally opposed to the requirements of the world economy. 
 
This remark opens a more general discussion about the forces that govern the restructuring 
of institutional configurations and by extension the conditions that warrant the medium-long 
term viability of a new regime that may derive from the process of hybridization previously 
described. 
 
o First, the world demand does not evolve towards totally new products and conversely, a large 
and possibly growing demand is addressed to the German industries that have maintained 
codetermination. Such a condition cannot be summarised only by the evolution of relative 
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prices, since the nature of income distribution at the world level also plays a quite important 
role (Boyer, Freyssenet, 2004). 
 
o This condition is necessary but not sufficient, as evidenced by the macroeconomic situation 
in Germany in 2005: exports are booming but job creation is sluggish and unemployment 
high. Basically a second condition states that some institutional mechanisms – including markets 
– redistribute incomes, in order to sustain the existing social compromises that legitimise for 
the citizens the present organisation of the economy. This is one of the principles at the 
origin of the successful restructuring of most open, small, social democratic countries 
(Lundvall, 2002).  
 
o A third condition relates to the nature and speed of technical change. If the permanent change in 
productive paradigms becomes the rule due to an acceleration of the intensity and the 
frequency of radical innovations, then the German configuration is not necessarily in good 
condition to maintain its highly institutionalised methods for forging skills, nurturing 
innovations and distributing the rents associated to incremental innovations. If on the 
contrary, the present decade experiences a stabilisation of the emerging productive system, 
then codetermination may do well and even prosper in the new stabilised regime. The links 
between firms, organisational choices and the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty have 
already been investigated in order to assess the viability of the Japanese firms and its 
differences with the American firm (Aoki, 1988, 1994). 
 
o Long run history, as well as contemporary international comparisons, recurrently shows that 
the choice about corporate governance is closely related with the bargaining power of 
shareholders, managers and permanent workers (Freeman, Medoff, 1984). The German 
codetermination is the expression of a compromise between the interests of capital and 
labour. Only a sufficient bargaining power of wage earners unions can warrant that this German 
specificity will survive in the new context. Elsewhere the weakness of wage earners 
organisations has eroded or even destroyed the previous mechanism of cooperation, since 
voice has been replaced by an exit (Jürgens, Krzywdzinski, Teipen, 2005). 
 
o In a period of flux and uncertainty, the expectations, representations and beliefs of the actors might 
play a crucial role in triggering a possible switch from one institutional configuration to 
another (Orléan, 2004). If the majority of the business community and the politicians are 
convinced that the German system is obsolete, even if the empirical evidence contradicts 
their hypothesis that it has become inefficient, the decision made by strategic actors might 
trigger a tipping from one regime to another. If by contrast, politicians are still convinced that 
the German corporate governance and the codetermination can be reformed instead of 
totally replaced, then the hybridization process may take place at the level of firms and 
unions. 
 
The interplay of these factors opens a large variety of trajectories for the German economy. 
Nevertheless, the various social science approaches help in drawing a provisional chart for the 
transformations of the present decade. 
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Figure 15 – Germany versus United-States: complementarity innovation systems 
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Transport
Weapons
Consumer goods
Civil engineering
Nuclear engineering
Basic materials chem
Polymers
Information tech
Telecommunications
-0,8 -0,6 -0,4 -0,2 0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8
93/94 83/84
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CONCLUSION 
Many authors have pointed out that the institutional complementarity hypothesis (ICH) could 
explain simultaneously the coherence of a brand of capitalism as well as the coexistence of 
different configurations, including in the era of globalisation. Another prognosis derived from 
this analysis stresses that it would be difficult, and basically inefficient, to try to mix the economic 
institutions belonging to a liberal market economy with the configuration of a coordinated 
market economy. The finding that the shareholder value principles have been introduced into the 
German system, without destroying, until 2002 at least, the sophisticated mechanisms of 
codetermination challenges these interpretations in terms of ICH. The present article has 
investigated how alternative theories or approaches might explain this paradoxical coexistence of 
shareholder value with codetermination. It does not pretend to bring new empirical evidence but 
it proposes simply to suggest a possible test of some alternative hypotheses (table 3). 
 
1. A first result points out that the hypothesis of a strict institutional complementarity governing quite 
all the features of German economy does not fit with the most recent observations. From a 
theoretical viewpoint, it is quite difficult to distinguish between a typical complementarity and 
a mere compatibility. For the time being, the introduction by some large German 
corporations of shareholder value has been compatible with a redesign of codetermination. 
 
2. If economies are resilient face to a series of shocks, it is probably because the coupling 
between the various institutions on one side, and between institutions and organisations on 
the other side is imperfect. Such a degree of freedom can be mobilised by actors in order to 
react to innovations and external shocks. The slack in the coupling of institutions is probably a key 
feature of market economies, and an explanation of their resilience. 
 
3. The use of the concept of complementarity, especially in formal modelling, might give the 
impression that the existence of complementarities is an ex ante property that is well known 
by all the actors who optimise accordingly their behaviour. It has been convincingly shown 
that the so admired German model of capitalism is not at all the consequence of an ex ante 
clearly perceived technical or economic complementarity. Quite to the contrary the 
contemporary noticeable competitiveness of the German manufacturing sectors is the 
unintended outcome of a series of innovations and transformations over nearly one century. Such 
a feature makes especially difficult any prognosis about the long term consequences of the 
introduction of shareholder value. 
 
4. In the Golden Age of the German economy, the complementarity – or at least the 
compatibility – between collective bargaining, codetermination at the company and shop 
floor level and house bank can be interpreted has the consequence of a social compromise 
between economic actors. Since the mid-80s, financial innovation and globalisation have 
triggered an erosion of this compromise, since the bargaining power of workers and unions 
has been declining. Consequently, the contemporary coexistence between codetermination 
and the adoption of some components of shareholder value might be the expression of a 
shift in the hierarchy of institutional forms, and no more of a balanced compromise between equal 
partners. The redesign of codetermination from a tool at the benefit of the collectivity of 
wage earners to a device in order to enhance firm specific competitiveness would be the 
direct consequence of this shift in the hierarchy of institutions.  
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Table 3 – Codetermination and corporate restructuring in Germany. A survey of alternative 
hypotheses and progresses 
 
THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
CORE 
HYPOTHESIS 
PROGNOSIS FOR 
GERMANY 
DEGREE OF 
LIKELIHOOD 
INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEMENTARITY   
o Strict 
complementarity 
1. Codetermination and two-tiers 
governance structures are 
strictly complementarity with 
patient capital 
 
Levelling off for 
codetermination, at odds 
with shareholder value 
Does not fit with 
the observation in 
2002 
o Loose 
complementarity 
2. There is some slack in this 
complementarity 
Possible coexistence of 
codetermination and 
corporate restructuring 
 
Significant, at least 
in the short-
medium term 
o Triadic 
complementarity 
with welfare 
3. Early retirement has made 
compatible shareholder value 
with codetermination 
The slimming down of 
welfare (Hartz IV) may 
block the present 
restructuring of industrial 
relations 
 
Many evidences of 
political instability 
since the 2000s 
o Institutional 
hierarchy 
4. From balanced compromise 
(complementarity) to an 
asymmetry in bargaining 
power (hierarchy) 
A redesign of 
codetermination in 
reaction to the imposition 
of a new governance mode 
Rather probable 
structural shift 
COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS   
o Conversion of 
one institution 
5. Conversion of the objective of 
codetermination 
Decentralization of 
German industrial relations 
Possible 
Japonisation of 
codetermination 
 
o Recombination of 
institutional 
arrangements 
6. From a complementarity 
between codetermination and 
collective bargaining towards a 
complementarity between 
codetermination and the 
financial regime 
De-structuring of the 
previous architecture of 
industrial relations 
Convergence with 
the previous 
scenario 
RÉGULATION THEORY   
o The micro/ 
macro link 
7. The micro compatibility of 
two arrangements does not 
imply the viability of their 
generalisation at the society 
wide level 
Cumulative discrepancy 
between the firms’ 
strategies and the 
coherence of the mode of 
régulation 
 
More and more 
likely since the 
German 
reunification 
o The time scale of 
institutional 
change 
 
8. Nearly a quarter of century is 
needed for assessing the 
impact of an institutional 
innovation 
The jury is still out: 
codetermination may 
survive…or not 
A prudent 
prognosis 
o Hybridization 9. Shareholder value principles 
are adapted to the German 
context and conversely 
industrial relations are 
evolving 
A new but still different 
institutional configuration 
compatible with world 
competition 
In line with the 
teaching of 
comparative and 
institutional 
analysis 
 
 
5. The comparative historical analysis brings a fresh and interesting analysis of the same process. 
Basically, the codetermination would have been converted into a quasi new institution 
governed by a quite different objective: promoting firm competitiveness and no more 
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extending the control of workers upon the economy, in complement to the strength of 
collective bargaining at the industry level. This conversion entitles a strengthening of the 
relations of codetermination with an emerging governance model, more favourable to 
shareholders’ interests. The subsequent recombination of previous German institutions is 
potentially sufficient to promote a new institutional configuration, quite different from the 
typical German social market economy model. 
 
6. The comparative institutional analysis, as well as international comparisons, suggests that 
paradoxically the German institutions would not converge towards a typical liberal market 
economy but more likely that they would become closer to the Japanese configuration: the 
industrial relations are decentralised at firms and plants level and the industry-wide collective 
bargaining is declining at the benefit of an individualisation of the employment relations. 
Quite a paradox indeed. In the epoch of the American pushed globalisation, the 
adoption/adaptation of shareholder value would induce a Japanisation of German industrial 
relations. The surprising compatibility of codetermination with shareholder value would be the 
equivalent of the tentative transposition of mass-production methods by Japanese 
manufacturers in the 50s.  Far from converging towards American Fordism, this strategy 
triggered an unintended consequence: the emergence of a quite different productive model, 
usually labelled as Toyotism. 
 
7. The analyses inspired by régulation theory deliver rather complementary conclusions. Firstly, 
the successful transposition by German firms of shareholder principles might be associated 
with a deterioration of the position of SME that used to play such a determinant role in the 
manufacturing of German competitiveness. Similarly, the externalisation of the costs 
associated to the slimming down of the workforce to the welfare system may induce a 
permanent and large unbalance in the public budget, as well as the resilience of a high 
unemployment. In other words, the micro compatibility between codetermination and 
shareholder value could be associated with major macroeconomic unbalances. Secondly, 
institutional change is a matter of generation; therefore it would be unwarranted to 
extrapolate the present compatibility to the next decades. Institutional change takes time and, 
concerning the viability of typical German institutions, the jury is still out about. Thirdly, 
since pure transposition from one country to another is the exception, the adaptation of 
shareholder value is setting into motion a complex process of trial and error. It does not 
necessarily converge towards the reference model that was initially emulated. Given the very 
incomplete adoption a direct finance and the fact that codetermination still has a strong legal 
recognition, contemporary Germany appears closer to the Japan of the 60s and 70s than to 
the contemporary United-States. 
 
When these diverse approaches are taken into account, a rather clear but provisional 
conclusion emerges: the old German model is probably irreversibly transformed and is evolving 
towards an unprecedented configuration, with only mild and distant relations to a typical liberal 
brand of capitalism. 
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